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NOTE
COPYRIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY -
Portions of Video Games May Constitute Protected Prop-
erty. Atari Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elec-
tronics Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
176 (1982).
I. INTRODUCTION
Copyright encourages individual effort by ensuring per-
sonal gain for creators' efforts.' Yet, the primary purpose of
copyright law is not to secure an economic benefit for an
author, but to benefit society 2 by stimulating the production
of the sciences and useful arts.3 The policy which underlies
the grant of a copyright monopoly is that creators who know
they will be rewarded for their efforts will produce works
which will benefit society.4 Copyright law attempts to pro-
tect a creator's efforts from piracy, while not creating too
broad a monopoly which might circumscribe the develop-
ment of the sciences and useful arts.
To fulfill the constitutional purpose of the copyright
clause, copyright law must continually adapt to technologi-
cal developments.5 Recently, the development of video
games has caused the law of copyright to evolve. Prior to
1981, the inventors of video games could not rely on copy-
1. The United States Supreme Court has stated that the "economic philosophy
behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the convic-
tion that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to ad-
vance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and
useful Arts."' Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
2. See 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A] (14th ed. 1982).
3. "The Congress shall have Power... To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
However, "It]here is some disagreement on whether 'science' refers to the work of
authors and 'useful arts to the product of inventors, or whether the relationship is
reversed." See M. NiMMER, supra note 2, § 1.03 n.l.
4. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
5. See generally Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125
(D.N.J. 1982).
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right law to protect their products from piracy. The origina-
tor was given a Hobson's choice: he could register the video
game's software, or he could attempt to register the game
itself. Neither type of registration would provide sufficient
protection.
If the creator registered the video game's software, it
would be protected. Courts have held that computer pro-
grams are the type of work intended by Congress to be in-
cluded among "works of authorship ' 6 protected by the
copyright act.7 As a practical matter, however, the value of
this type of copyright is limited because "[t]he identical au-
diovisual display may be created from many different com-
puter programs . "8... Consequently, the originator is
assured of a copyright, but its protection is minimal.
If the originator chose to copyright the game itself, the
scope of protection is limited as well because a game is, for
the most part, a "work of utility."9 A work of utility is not
within the subject matter of work protected by copyright
law. 10 For an object to be copyrightable, it must be a work
of authorship." A court must determine what part of the
game is utilitarian and, therefore, not protected and what
part is a pictorial, graphic or sculptural work of authorship,
sufficiently original to be protected. 12 Generally, games as a
whole have been held not to be copyrightable, 13 while parts
of games which are sufficiently close to the statutory subject
matter have been granted copyrights. 14 Labels for games,
6. "Copyright protection subsists. . . in original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid
of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. app. § 102(a) (1976).
7. Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171, 173 (N.D.
Cal. 1981).
8. Stem Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 523 F. Supp. 635, 639 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), a'd,
669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
9. See I M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.18. Games and toys are included in this
section as works of utility. Id. § 2.18(H)(1), (3).
10. Id. § 2.18.
11. 17 U.S.C. app. § 102(a) (1976).
12. Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 914-15 (2d Cir. 1980).
13. See, eg., Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, 611 F.2d 296
(9th Cir. 1979); Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 56 F. Supp. 987 (S.D.N.Y. 1944),
at'd, 150 F.2d 512 (2d Cir., 1945).
14. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.18(H)(3).
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patterns of game boards and designs on playing cards have
been copyrighted as pictorial or graphic works.'-'
However, the subject matter of video games does not fit
under the traditional copyright categories for games - pic-
torial or graphic works. Rather, the subject matter of video
games - a motion picture or other audiovisual work - falls
under title 17, section 102(a)(6) of the United States Code.
Audiovisual works are
works that consist of a series of related images which are
intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines,
or devices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equip-
ment, together with accompanying sounds, if any, regard-
less of the nature of the material objects, such as films or
tapes, in which the works are embodied.16
The subject matter of a motion picture or audiovisual work
is generally not constrained by the notion of the work as be-
ing utilitarian.17 Thus, a video game could receive enhanced
protection under a copyright as an audiovisual work.
A series of recent cases has discussed the scope of copy-
right protection for a video game under a copyright as an
audiovisual work.' 8 Atari, Inc. v. North American Phitips
Consumer Electronics Corp. ,19 decided by the Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit on March 2, 1982, is a case
within the mainstream of these developments. This note will
examine the foundations for the Atari decision and will ad-
15. Id.
16. 17 U.S.C. app. § 101 (1976).
17. See generally Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d
852 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis
Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
18. Williams Elec., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982); Atari, Inc.
v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 176 (1982); Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982); Midway
Mfg. Co. v. Omni Video Games, 668 F.2d 70 (lst Cir. 1981); Durham Indus., Inc. v.
Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980); Cinematronics, Inc. v. K. Noma Enter., No.
81-4644, slip op. (C.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 547
F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222
(D. Md. 1981); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125 (D.N.J.
1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466 (D. Neb. 1981); Nintendo
of America, Inc. v. Bay Coin Distrib., Inc., COPYRIGlrT L. REPs. (CCH) 25,409
(E.D.N.Y. May 28, 1982).
19. Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., No. 81-C-6434, slip
op. (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 1981), rev'd, 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 176
(1982).
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dress how early objections to the copyright of video games
were resolved, the methodologies used by the Atari court to
find the likelihood of infringement, and how these method-
ologies reflect the purposes of the copyright clause.
II. A PRIMER ON COPYRIGHT LAW
Section 102(a) of the copyright law delineates the subject
matter of copyright protection and protects original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.2 °
The scope of this grant, however, is limited by section
102(b), which provides that copyright protection does not ex-
tend to an idea.21 "The copyright owner's protectible prop-
erty consists in the development, treatment and expression
given in the copyrighted work . -22 Thus, while an idea
is not copyrightable, its expression is.23 If the medium of
expression is a literary work, its expression is characterized
as a series of words, numbers or other verbal or numerical
symbols or indicia.24 For example, characters or themes are
generally not copyrightable 25 in a literary work. If the me-
dium of expression is an audiovisual work, the expression is
characterized as a series of related images. 6 This series, if it
is original, will be protected by copyright law.
Basically, there are two elements to an infringement ac-
tion: first, the establishment of a valid copyright;27 and sec-
ond, the establishment of copying by the defendant.28
20. 17 U.S.C. app. § 102(a) (1976).
21. "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship ex-
tend to any idea ... ." 17 U.S.C. app. § 102(b) (1976).
22. Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348, 353
(S.D. Cal. 1955). See Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 COLUM. L. REV.
503, 513 (1945).
23. See Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free
Speech and Press?, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1180, 1189 (1970).
24. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 20.4(A).
25. See, e.g., Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 216
F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954). But see Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979) (cartoon characters may be
copyrightable).
26. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.09(A).
27. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 13.01(A).
28. Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 176 (1982); Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broad-
casting Cos., Inc., 654 F.2d 204, 207 (2d Cir. 1981).
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Copying can be inferred if the defendant had access to the
original work29 and if the challenged work is substantially
similar to the original work.30
III. FOUNDATION FOR THE ATARI DECISION - THE
VALIDITY OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
In cases decided prior to the Atari decision, two argu-
ments were asserted challenging the video game creator's
ability to copyright a game.3 1 First, it was argued that the
works were not copyrightable subject matter,32 and, second,
it was argued that the works were not original because of
player participation.33 These defenses were raised in most of
the early cases and were consistently rejected.34
The defense based on subject matter centered on the re-
quirement of section 102(a) that the work of authorship be
fixed in a "tangible medium of expression."35 Defendants
argued that a video game was simply not a tangible medium
of expression and, therefore, constituted noncopyrightable
subject matter. However, the courts rejected this argument
because it failed to distinguish between the work which is
subject to copyright protection (the audiovisual display) and
the tangible medium in which the work is fixed (the com-
puter program).36
In Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Dirkschneider37 the Fed-
eral District Court for Nebraska proposed a test to make this
distinction: "First, the Court must determine whether the
plaintiffs works fall within one of the copyrightable subject
matters enumerated in the Act. 17 U.S.C. § 120(a). Second,
the court must determine whether the work is fixed in a tan-
29. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 13.02(A).
30. Id.
31. See Kramsky, The Video Game: Our Legal System Grapples With A Social
Phenomena, 64 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 335, 341-46 (1982).
32. See, e.g., Stem Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir. 1982).
33. Id. at 855-56.
34. See, e.g., id.; Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466, 479 (D.
Neb. 1981).
35. 17 U.S.C. app. § 102(a) (1976).
36. See, e.g., Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466,479 (D. Neb.
1981); 24 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 296, 297 (1982).
37. 543 F. Supp. 466 (D. Neb. 1981).
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gible medium of expression. ' 38 A video game fits within the
copyrightable subject matter of an audiovisual work.39
However, a work must not only consist of copyrightable sub-
ject matter, but it must also be fixed in a tangible medium of
expression.4° A work meets this test "when its embodiment
in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the
author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a pe-
riod of more than transitory duration. '41 In Dirkschneider
the court concluded that the work is fixed in the printed cir-
cuit boards which direct the video sequences. 42 "The printed
circuit boards are tangible objects from which the audiovi-
sual works may be perceived for a period of time more than
transitory." 43
The second argument refuting the validity of the copy-
right was the lack of originality due to player participation. 44
In Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected this argument by
finding that "originality" is not destroyed by player partici-
pation and that the required originality was supplied when
someone first conceived what the audiovisual display would
sound and look like.45
IV. THE ATAtR DECISION
A. Procedural Posture
The Atari and Midway Corporations jointly registered a
copyright for the video game PAC-MAN,46 and licensed
the Atari Corporation to manufacture and sell the game.
Subsequently, North American developed a similar game
called "K. C. Munchkin." Atari brought suit for copyright
38. Id. at 479.
39. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.18(H)(3)(b).
40. 17 U.S.C. app. § 102(a) (1976).
41. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466, 480 (D. Neb. 1981)
(quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976)).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Stem Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 856 (2d Cir. 1982).
45. Id.
46. Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elems. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 610
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 176 (1982).
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infringement, initially seeking a preliminary injunction
prohibiting the marketing and distribution of North Ameri-
can's game.47 The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois denied the motion, concluding
that it was unlikely Atari would succeed in proving copy-
right infringement.48 This decision was based principally on
three findings of fact. First, the "maze," or game boards, are
different. In the K. C. Munchkin game the maze changes
continuously.49 Second, the characters are different. In the
K. C. Munchkin game they are much spookier.50 Third, K.
C. Munchkin is played differently. It is more a game of
strategy than PAC-MAN.5 1 The court held that, since the
games are significantly different, the probability of success
on the merits of a copyright infringement suit was low.
The plaintiffs appealed the denial of the motion for a
preliminary injunction. The court of appeals reversed 52 and
criticized the district court for improperly restricting the cri-
teria which should be applied in deciding whether to grant a
preliminary injunction.53 The district court had only consid-
ered the plaintiffs' chance of ultimate success on the merits.54
But, "[flour factors [should have entered] into the district
court's exercise of discretion to grant or deny a preliminary
injunction ... ."5 The court of appeals, upon considera-
47. Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., No. 81-C-6434, slip
op. (N.D. IMI. Dec. 4, 1981), rey'd, 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 176
(1982).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 7.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 16.
52. Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 620
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 176 (1982).
53. Id. at 614.
54. Id.
55. These four factors are:
(1) [W]hether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy at law or will be
irreparably harmed if the injunction does not issue; (2) whether the threatened
injury to the plaintiff outweighs the threatened harm the injunction may inflict
on the defendant; (3) whether the plaintiff has at least a reasonable likelihood
of success on the merits; and (4) whether the granting of a preliminary injunc-
tion will disserve the public interest.
Id. at 613 (citations omitted).
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tion of all four factors, directed the lower court to enter a
preliminary injunction.5 6
B. The Facts
PAC-MAN and K. C. Munchkin are maze-chase
games. In games of this type the player directs a central
figure through a maze in which it consumes dots and avoids
pursuit figures. The characters can reverse roles so that the
central character can chase the original pursuing figures.
The goal of this type of game is to accumulate the most
points by gobbling dots and monsters.
To determine if copyright infringement exists, a detailed
comparison of the games must be made. First, the Atari
court compared the maze designs.5 7 The PAC-MAN maze
is rectangular in shape and drawn in bright blue double
lines.58  Located on either side of the maze is a "wrap-
around," which is a tunnel in which the central figure can
avoid capture. 9 In the middle of the maze is a corral, which
is a rectangular box,60 where the pursuit figures go to regen-
erate.6" K. C. Munchkin's maze is also rectangular, but it is
drawn in a single, more subdued purple line.62 This maze
also contains a wraparound mechanism and a centrally lo-
cated corral, 3 but the corral is a square which rotates every
two or three seconds. 4  K. C. Munchkin, unlike PAC-
MAN, has one dead-end passageway. 5
Next, the court compared the scoring tables.6 6 In PAC-
MAN the scoring table is located at the top of the maze.67
The players' scores are displayed in white on the left and
right ends of the table and the high score to date is displayed
in the middle.68 When a player consumes all the dots, the
56. Id. at 620-21.
57. Id. at 610-12.
58. Id. at 610.
59. Id. at 610-11.
60. Id. at 611.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 611-12.
65. Id. at 611.
66. Id. at 612.
67. Id. at 611.
68. Id. at 612.
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entire maze flashes blue and white and a new maze ap-
pears.69 The scoring table for the K. C. Munchkin game is
similar in that the scores register on either end of the table. 0
However, in K. C. Munchkin, the name of the highest scorer
can be registered in flashing pink and orange letters.71
The court next compared the basic characters.72 The
principal character in both games is a "gobbler." In PAC-
MAN the gobbler is a large yellow dot with a v-shaped
mouth which opens and closes. The gobbler makes gobbling
noises as it travels around the maze.73 When it is overtaken
by a pursuit character, the gobbler deflates, makes a whining
sound and disappears in a starburst.74 K. C. Munchkin's
principal character is also a gobbler. It is a blue-green figure
with horns, eyes and a mouth.75 The mouth is v-shaped as is
the mouth of the PAC-MAN gobbler.76  The K. C.
Munchkin gobbler also makes gobbling noises as it moves
about the maze.77 If the gobbler is captured by a pursuit
figure, it disappears in a manner similar to that of the
PAC-MAN gobbler.78 This central character differs from
the PAC-MAN gobbler in the range of expression it can
exhibit. The K. C. Munchkin gobbler can smile, chuckle
and frown.79
The pursuit characters in the PAC-MAN game are
called "ghost monsters." There are four ghost monsters,
each shaped like a bell jar and colored red, blue, turquoise
and orange, respectively.80 The ghost monsters appear to
travel about the maze on three legs.8 1 These monsters have
large white eyes with blue centers which look in the direction
the monster is moving. 82 At the start of the game, the mon-
69. Id.
70. Id. at 612.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 611.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 612.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. id. at 611.
81. Id.
82. Id.
1983]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
sters are located in the corral.83 The K. C. Munchkin game
has three ghost monsters. 4 These monsters are round and
have two horns, eyes that look in the direction the monster is
moving, and three legs.85 The monsters are also stationed in
the corral at the beginning of the game; however, they are
arranged in a piggyback type arrangement rather than in a
side-by-side arrangement as in PAC-MAN.86 .
In both games when the gobbler consumes a power cap-
sule, the characters' roles are reversed - the gobbler pursues
the ghost monsters.8 7 In PAC-MAN when the monsters
panic, their color turns to blue, their eyes contract, their
mouths wrinkle and they reverse direction and proceed at a
reduced speed, while in K. C. Munchkin the monsters con-
tinue to run at the same speed.8 8 Before the roles reverse
again, the monsters warn the players by flashing blue and
white.89 If a monster is caught, it disappears and regenerates
in the corral.9° In both games the monsters are vulnerable
because they move more slowly than the gobblers. In the K.
C. Munchkin game, when a gobbler eats a power capsule,
the monsters turn purple and reverse direction.9' If a ghost
monster is caught, it disappears except for its eyes and feet,
which wander harmlessly around the board.2 If, however, a
corral opening appears near a captured ghost monster, the
monster will enter it and regenerate. 3 Before the characters
reverse roles, the ghost monsters flash their original colors.9 4
The gobbler accumulates points by gobbling dots. In
PAC-MAN there are over two hundred uniformly spaced
83. Id.
84. Id. at 612.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 611.
88. Id. The speed at which the monsters travel is an important distinction in the
design of the games.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 612.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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dots.95 In K. C. Munchkin there are twelve randomly spaced
dots, four of which are power capsules.96
C. The Extent of Protection
As noted above, although the general subject matter of
potential copyright protection may constitute a work of au-
thorship and, therefore, qualify for copyright protection, it
does not necessarily follow that the entire work will be copy-
rightable.97 Only the expression of an idea can be pro-
tected;98 a bare idea or utilitarian structure is not protected
by copyright law.99 Thus, the analytical starting point, ac-
cording to theAtari decision, is to determine what portion of
PAC-MAN constitutes the expression of an idea and what
part is the idea itself. °° Judge Learned Hand in Nichols v.
Universal Pictures Corp. 101 described a test to make the dis-
tinction between an idea and the expression of an idea - the
"abstraction test":
Upon any work. a great number of patterns of increas-
ing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the
incident is left out .... [T]here is a point in this series of
abstractions where they are no longer protected, since
otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his
"ideas" to which, apart from their expression, his property
is never extended. Nobody has ever been able to fix that
boundary, and nobody ever can.... As respects plays,
the controversy chiefly centers upon the characters and se-
quence of incident, these being the substance.10 2
95. Id. In PAC-MAN the dots move at a continuous speed.
96. Id. In K. C. Munchkin the dots move faster as they disappear.
97. See, e.g., Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 216
F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 1954) (court found a valid literary copyright for the story the
"Maltese Falcon," but not for the character "Sam Spade").
98. 17 U.S.C. app. § 102(a) (1976). See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods.,
Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977).
99. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, §§ 1.08(d), 2.18. But see Hopkins, Ideas,
Their Time Has Come: An Argument and a Proposalfor Copyrighting Ideas, 46 ALB.
L. REv. 443 (1982).
100. Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614-
15 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103. S. Ct. 176 (1982).
101. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
102. Id. at 121 (citations omitted).
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The idea in PAC-MAN, as identified by the courts, is a
maze-chase game designed to appeal to nonviolent play-
ers. 0 3 Thus, North American was free to copy this idea. 1'
This idea-expression dichotomy deserves further com-
ment. 105 In the copyright context, an idea and the expression
of this idea are at opposite ends of the continuum of protec-
tion. The former, the general overriding theme of a work, is
not protected, while the latter, the specified components of a
work which collectively express the idea, are protected. As
components of a work (such as characters and story se-
quence) become more generalized, that is, lose their unique
or distinguishing features, they lose their right to
protection.)0
The extent to which an expression can be generalized
and still be protected is dependent on the nature of the idea
and the nature of its expression. The greatest scope of copy-
right protection exists when the expression is complex and
the idea is simplistic. 0 7 The least amount of protection ex-
ists when the idea and its expression are indistinguishable.
A well known example of this rule is Herbert Rosenthal Jew-
elry Corp. v. Kalpakian. °8 In that case plaintiff copyrighted
a pin in the shape of a bee; 0 9 the defendant produced a simi-
lar pin. 10 Plaintiff commenced a suit for copyright infringe-
ment, but the court dismissed the suit: "When the 'idea' and
its 'expression' are thus inseparable, copying the 'expression
will not be barred, since protecting the 'expression' in such
circumstances would confer a monopoly of the 'idea' upon
the copyright owner free of the conditions and limitations
imposed by the patent law.""' Thus, when there is unity of
the idea and the expression, only the exact form will be pro-
tected from copying.
103. Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 617-
18 (7th Cir.), cer. denied, 103 S. Ct. 176 (1982).
104. Id.
105. See Kramsky, supra note 31, at 346-51.
106. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text. See also Note, "Expression"
and "Originality" in Copyright Law, I1 WASHBURN L.J. 400 (1972).
107. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1168 (9th Cir. 1977).
108. 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971).
109. Id. at 739.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 742.
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The Atari court, using the above noted principles, at-
tempted to distinguish the idea of a maze-chase game from
the protected portion. First, the court asked whether there
was unity of the idea and the expression in the audiovisual
work: that is, is the PAC-MAN type expression the only
way to express the game's idea?"' -2 The court answered this
in the negative, finding that the PAC-MAN form provided
something additional to the idea1 3 and thus no unity ex-
isted. Second, the court applied the abstraction test to deter-
mine the scope of protection.' 4 The court analogized the
play of the game to written game rules which have been held
to be too abstract to constitute the expression of the idea. 15
The video and audio components, however, were held to
be sufficiently concrete to be copyrightable." 6 The court
then distinguished between protected and unprotected video
and audio components. 1 7 The maze, scoring table, tunnel
and dots were held to be standard game devices. 1 8 Thus,
Atari could claim infringement only if these components
were identical. The K. C. Munchkin and PAC-MAN com-
ponents are not identical; therefore, no copyright infringe-
ment exists. 119  The gobbler and PAC-MAN characters
themselves were held to be independent creative expressions
of the game idea. 20 Based on this finding the court held that
the characters were protected by copyright law.12'
1. Infringement
As a general rule infringement is established upon proof
of ownership, access -and substantial similarity. 22 In Atari
the only infringement issue was substantial similarity. 23
112. Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 617
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 176 (1982).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 617-18.
121. See generally 24 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 517 (1982).
122. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1977).
123. Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 176 (1982).
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However, it is the district and appeals courts' differing views
on the concept of substantial similarity which result in the
different holdings. Professor Nimmer, in his treatise on
copyright law, states that infringement exists when the ac-
cused work is substantially similar to the original work.124 It
is apparent from the Atari district court's comparison of the
games as a whole that it applied this general rule.125 How-
ever, this rule is merely a general statement of the concept of
infringement and, if applied literally to all cases, could pro-
duce "untenable results."' 26 The Atari appeals court, in its
formulation of the rule, restated it to take into consideration
the nonprotectibility of ideas and utilitarian structures.
Thus, infringement exists only when the accused work is
substantially similar to the protected portion of the original
work. 127 The latter court phrased the test as "whether the
accused work is so similar to the plaintiff's work that an or-
dinarily reasonable person would conclude that the defend-
ant unlawfully appropriated the plaintiffs protectible
expression by taking material of substance and value."' 128
According to the appeals court, the game characters con-
stituted protected property. The court compared the gob-
blers and determined that they were substantially similar: 29
both are round, have v-shaped mouths, gobble and make
124. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 13.03.
125. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
126. For example, one court has used the following illustration to demonstrate
this:
[a] copyright could be obtained over a cheaply manufactured plaster statue of
a nude. Since ownership of a copyright is established, subsequent manufactur-
ers of statues would take the grave risk of being found to be infringers if their
statues were substantially similar and access were shown. The burden of proof
on the plaintiff would be minimal, since most statues of nudes would in all
probability be substantially similar to the cheaply manufactured plaster one.
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162-
63 (9th Cir. 1977). It has been suggested that access can be inferred if the challenged
work is substantially similar to the original work itself, but that infringement only
exists if the challenged work is substantially similar to the protected portion of the
original work. See generally P. GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND
RELATED STATE DocTRINEs 849-50 n.1 (1981).
127. Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 176 (1982).
128. Id.
129. Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 618
(7th Ci.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 176 (1982).
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gobbling noises. The ghost monsters were also found to be
substantially similar. 30  The size, shape, and manner of
movement were identical. Also, in both games, the charac-
ters exhibited role reversal. The defendants argued numer-
ous dissimilarities but the court found infringement, stating
that the focus of a copyright infringement action "is on the
similarities in [the] protectible expression."''
E. The Basis for a Preliminary Injunction
The district court listed the four factors which should
guide the exercise of discretion in granting a preliminary in-
junction, 32 but its analysis was limited to probable infringe-
ment. 33 The Seventh Circuit was adamant that prospective
success on the merits was only one of the four positions
which should be addressed in a determination of whether a
preliminary injunction should issue. The court proceeded to
address the three additional issues and stated its finding on
each. First, it concluded irreparable injury is presumed
from a showing of copyright infringement. 34 Second, it con-
cluded the balance of hardships and public interest factors
do not weigh against the issuance of a preliminary injunc-
tion. 35  Third, it concluded the purpose of the copyright
clause in encouraging creativity is not curtailed by a coun-
tervailing public interest, which could be asserted by the de-
fendant.1 36 The structure of the appeals court opinion, which
based reversal on the failure to analyze all the factors, was a
means to prevent the erosion of the four factor test for a pre-
liminary injunction in these circumstances. 137
130. Id.
131. Id. at 619 (emphasis omitted).
132. Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., No. 81-C-6434, slip
op. at 15 (N.D. IML Dec. 4, 1981),rev'd, 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
176 (1982).
133. Id. at 14.
134. Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 620
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 176 (1982).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See Nintendo of America, Inc. v. Bay Coin Distrib., Inc., No. CV-82-1153,
slip op. (E.D.N.Y. May 28, 1982), wherein the probability of success was the only
factor in determining whether a preliminary injunction should issue. But see Midway
Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466 (D. Neb. 1981) (analysis of all four
factors).
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F Comparison and Explanation
The district court found a low piobability of success on
the merits, while the appeals court, presented with the same
set of facts, concluded Atari had a high probability of suc-
cess on the merits of a copyright infringement claim. These
different holdings are not merely based on different views of
the evidence, but on different methods of analysis.
The district court concluded that the games were sub-
stantially different. The court based this holding on a find-
ing that "the maze defendants utilized is different and the
way their game is played is different from plaintiff's 'Pac-
Man' game."'' 38 The district court's analysis focused on the
total game, rather than reducing the game into protected and
unprotected components. The effect of the district court's
analysis is to create a more stringent test for infringement
since the potential monopoly is greater if the whole game is
potentially protected.
The appeals court, on the other hand, concluded that the
game board and the method of play were too abstract to be
protected. Thus, the appeals court's methodology is more
narrow; it would first separate the abstract idea from the
protected expression of the idea and then it would compare
the original and challenged work to determine substantial
similarity.
This more specific test employed by the appeals court
serves the purpose of the copyright clause 39 better than the
district court's more general analysis. The specific test limits
the level of monopolization an original author may secure
through a copyright. Only the creative efforts, rather than
the ideas, can be monopolized. Thus, society is benefited by
the creative efforts of the original author but the source of
the original expression is not limited. Because the scope of
monopolization is reduced, it is easier to prove infringement.
Moreover, the appeals court's analysis protects the por-
tion of the property which is likely to be copied. The con-
cept of infringement is tied to the value of the property. A
138. Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., No. 81-C-6434, slip
op. at 16-17 (N.D. IMI. Dec. 4, 1981), rev'd, 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 176 (1982).
139. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (see supra note 3 for a textual reading).
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defendant unlawfully appropriates protected property by
taking material of substance and value.' 40 The appeals court
made a practical determination that the PAC-MAN char-
acter, with its distinctive size, shape and motion, was the val-
uable part of the plaintiffs' property. Thus, to allow a
competitor to take this portion of the work would discourage
the production of artistic and scientific work. The lower
court's opinion, although based on general rules of copyright
law, does not focus on the part of the plaintiffs' property
which might be pirated.
V. CONCLUSION
Through the registration of the game as an audiovisual
work and through the use of the idea-expression dichotomy
to limit the protected property, prior to a determination of
substantial similarity, a novel result is achieved - "effec-
tive" copyright protection for a game.1 4 ' Effective protection
occurs because the appeals court's method of analysis pro-
vides protection for the valuable portion of the game - the
PAC-MAN character. The method of analysis chosen by
the appeals court effectuates the purposes of the copyright
clause.' 42 The Atari decision demonstrates that it is not
enough for a court to apply general rules to new technologi-
cal developments; only if the rules are adapted so that they
protect the valuable portion of the property can they mean-
ingfully encourage the production of artistic and scientific
works.
SUSAN K. BENNETT
140. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
141. Another novel result not discussed by the district or the appeals courts is the
significance of copyrighting a character. See supra note 25.
142. Esezobor, Concepts in Copyright Protection, 23 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y
258, 266-67 (1976).
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